Egypt’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Egypt’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
August 11, 2014
Prof. Yoram Meital
Egypt, under Sisi, wants a diplomatic agreement on Gaza that strengthens Abbas and weakens Hamas.
By Prof. Yoram Meital, chair of BGU’s Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy
It is now exactly a year since the Egyptian army overthrew Islamist president Mohammed Morsi. The dramatic move led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was followed by an uncompromising crackdown on the Islamist Muslim Brothers and open hostility toward their allies outside Egypt – most prominently Hamas.
In Sisi’s view the battle against the Muslim Brotherhood is a fight for the survival of his regime. It is his highest priority and sets the tone for both domestic and foreign policy.
After a string of lethal terror attacks against soldiers and civilians, he declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Thousands of its activists were arrested and severely punished. Some were sentenced to death.
Against the background of Sisi’s protracted no-holds-barred fight against the Islamist organization, relations between Ca iro and Washington soured. The US, which had supplied Egypt with generous aid and support for three decades, was sharply critical of Morsi’s overthrow and the brutal suppression of the opposition by the armed forces.
The Obama Administration froze $250 million from an annual aid package of $1.3 billion and postponed the transfer of fighter planes and attack helicopters. These limited steps were an attempt to maneuver between the moral obligation to condemn Sisi’s actions and the fear that more severe steps might boomerang, undermining the interests of both countries and possibly even triggering a grave Middle East crisis.
The new Egyptian regime rejected the American criticism as out of hand. It argued that Washington was misreading the big picture and failing to recognize the seriousness of the threat posed by the Brotherhood to moderate regimes across the region.
The Sisi government’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherood and hostility toward Hamas, the Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch, sparked a major crisis in Cairo’s relations with Qatar and Turkey, the two main regional backers of the Sunni Islamist movements.
In contrast, the oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf were quick to take Sisi’s side. Indeed, financial aid of around $20 billion from the Saudis and gulf emirates saved Egypt from economic collapse.
The unwritten alliance between Cairo and Riyadh is based on similar threat perceptions – a common fear of deeper Iranian involvement in Syria and Iraq, and apprehension at the growing power of political and jihadist Islamism. This view is shared by Jordan, the Palestinian Authority and Israel – whose representatives worked publicly and through quiet diplomatic channels to mitigate international criticism of the way Sisi came to power.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
The Sisi regime’s policy toward the fighting between Israel and Hamas derives from this wider context of its struggle against radical Islam.
During Morsi’s brief term in office, Hamas received unprecedented Egyptian support. These close ties aroused the ire of Egypt’s military leaders and security services.
With the army takeover, Egypt-Hamas relations quickly deteriorated.
Hamas was accused of interfering in Egypt’s internal affairs, and security officials pointed to its involvement in the activities of militant jihadist groups operating in the Sinai against the Egyptian army.
To sever these ties, the Egyptian military destroyed hundreds of tunnels along the border with Gaza, and only allowed intermittent passage of goods and people from Gaza to Egypt through the Rafah border crossing point. This tightened the siege on Gaza further aggravated civilian hardship.
Egypt initially blamed both Israel and Hamas for the current outbreak of hostilities, but very early on argued that it was Hamas’ rejection of the Egyptian ceasefire initiative that was mainly to blame for the continued suffering and bloodshed among the civilian population in Gaza.
Hamas leaders came under fierce attack in the Egyptian media, with some speakers openly calling for the success of the Israeli offensive.
For the Hamas leadership – and the Palestinian people as a whole – this unprecedented criticism of an Arab party fighting Israel came like a bolt out of the blue.
Egyptian opposition protests against the government line were limited in scope.
Muslim Brotherhood supporters held a few protest marches and the left-wing parties expressed solidarity with Palestinian suffering, castigated Israel and sharply criticized the feeble responses of the Arab regimes and the international community.
Similar attitudes proliferated on the social networks. But the limited scale of the protest enabled Egypt’s leaders to stick to their position.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was quick to recognize the dramatic change in Egyptian policy on Hamas and its advantages for Israel.
From the initial stages of the military campaign, he defined coordination with Egypt as a key objective, which he continues to cultivate.
The shared hostility toward Hamas provided fertile ground for significant political and security cooperation between Cairo and Jerusalem. According to Israeli politicians and ex-generals, the enmity between the Sisi administration and Hamas made it possible for Israel to hit the military infrastructure in Gaza more heavily.
Soon after the fighting erupted, Egypt announced a two-stage plan for ending hostilities. First there would be a ceasefire, and only after it took hold would negotiations on the parties’ demands begin.
Egypt rejected the Palestinian militia groups’ insistence that a cease-fire be declared only after they received international guarantees for lifting the siege on Gaza. The Egyptian document was drafted in close coordination with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, but without consulting the Hamas leadership.
Israel accepted the Egyptian cease-fire proposal almost immediately. The Palestinian militant groups rejected it out of hand, laying bare the lack of trust between Egypt and Hamas.
Hamas pinned its hopes on support from Qatar and Turkey, and tried to undermine the Egyptian initiative. At the height of diplomatic efforts to achieve a cease-fire, Khaled Mashaal, the Qatar-based head of the Hamas political wing, publicly censured Cairo. “We have no reservations about Egypt’s role, but we won’t allow anyone to interfere with our decisions or to impose anything on us,” he declared.
The mounting civilian toll in Gaza sparked widespread anger in Egypt against the Israeli offensive. While during the first few weeks of conflict Egyptian opposition censure had been limited, in the fourth week of fighting the protests took on a far more strident tone, with much of the criticism aimed at the Sisi government.
As a result, in its public diplomacy, Egypt condemned the suffering of the Palestinian civilian population in much stronger language. At the same time, the Sisi government continued to regard Hamas as inimical to Egyptian interests, and took steps designed to weaken its exclusive control of Gaza by increasing the involvement of the Palestinian Authority.
In early August, after its redeployment of forces in Gaza, it seemed that Israel favored ending Operation Protective Edge unilaterally, without an agreement like the one outlined in the Egyptian initiative.
Therefore, the armed conflict with the Palestinian militias is likely to continue and perhaps even escalate, at least in the short term.
The “day after” the latest round of fighting poses difficult challenges for all parties concerned, including Egypt. In the absence of an Israel-Gaza agreement, the Egyptian government is likely to encounter sharp domestic criticism and increasing domestic pressure to open the Rafah border crossing point on a regular basis and send in massive aid to help alleviate the looming humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.
The “honeymoon” between Jerusalem and Cairo during the Gaza fighting is liable to face a stern test, which could bring substantive differences to the fore. As Israel continues to advance on the military track, Egypt under Sisi wants a diplomatic agreement that strengthens Abbas and weakens Hamas.
Like Israel, the Sisi administration wants Gaza demilitarized. But Egypt believes this can only be achieved in the framework of a comprehensive peace deal in which Gaza and the West Bank together comprise the territory of a sovereign, independent Palestinian state.
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